CHAPTER 4.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM LTBP
4.1
Introduction
technical programme leaders contributed their
opinions.
This chapter concentrates on issues
for which there was broad consensus from
The Lake Tanganyika Biodiversity
Project (LTBP) has many notable
achievements, including: technical
the region and from the implementing
studies
in
biodiversity,
pollution,
subcontractors. Where there was not
sedimentation, fishing practices, socio-
consensus, the statement was qualified or
economics and an environmental education
both viewpoints were reported.
programme; a transboundary diagnostic
analysis (TDA) of the threats to Lake
4.2 Civil Wars and Insecurity
Tanganyika's biodiversity; a Strategic Action
Programme (SAP) providing a prioritised list
The African Great Lakes region has been the
of these threats and strategies for
theatre for considerable conflict and turmoil
ameliorating them; a draft legal convention
during the last decade. Burundi has been in
binding Tanganyika's riparian nations to the
a civil war of varying intensity since the
sustainable management of the lake's natural
assassination of its first democratically elected
resources; and finally a commitment from
president in 1993. As a result of a 1996 coup
GEF and the governments of Burundi, D.R.
d'etat, Burundi was also subjected to an
Congo, Tanzania and Zambia to continue this
international embargo imposed by
process through a PDF-B grant to support a
neighboring countries.
planning and preparation phase to implement
Nearby, D.R. Congo entered into a
the SAP and ratify the convention.
revolution backed by Rwanda in 1995 that
These
achievements
were
eventually toppled the former president,
accomplished within a sometimes tense and
Mobutu Sese Seko. Within 18 months the
unpredictable political climate. They were
war had re-ignited, this time between the new
accomplished against numerous technical
Congolese government and Rwanda and
and logistical obstacles. While we enjoy these
Uganda. Throughout this project Rwandan
victories, we also note that we made some
troops occupied and controlled eastern
mistakes. This final chapter analyzes our
Congo, including the lakeshore regions.
experiences and summarizes the lessons we
As a result of these wars and
learned in implementing LTBP so that other
insecurities and events in neighboring
projects may benefit from our experiences.
Rwanda, Burundi and D.R. Congo both
To canvas opinions from the region,
experienced massive refugee movements.
questionnaires were sent to all LTBP National
Many displaced people from these three
Coordinators,
Assistant
National
countries sought refuge in western Tanzania.
Coordinators, and to key personnel involved
These are not ideal conditions for
in the technical programme (special studies
conservation initiatives. In our experience,
and Strategic Action Programme). There was
however, while civil war and insecurity
a 67 percent return rate for these
typically affect everybody in some way, they
questionnaires, with all countries having at
are perpetuated by a comparatively small
least two respondents. In addition, the Project
portion of the population. And it is exactly
Coordination Unit (PCU), members of the
during these times that the natural resource
agencies forming the NRI Consortium
base is most vulnerable and conservation and
(implementing subcontractor) and some
resource planning initiatives are most
109

important. Bilateral and multilateral aid to
Burundi until the security situation normalized
countries at times of war is obviously a
six months later. While the project was never
sensitive issue. Nonetheless, we found that
able to reunite the PC and SLO in the same
in spite of the many constraints imposed by
location and this, both felt, was a distinct
civil insecurity, a considerable amount can be
disadvantage, this was probably the best
achieved. Our experiences with this are
arrangement given the constraints.
outlined below.
In addition to Burundi, this
arrangement also allowed D.R. Congo to be
4.2.1 Remain flexible and seek creative
engaged in the project. D.R. Congo was
solutions
under phase IV security during most of LTBP,
which stipulates that expatriate staff cannot
The Project Document specified that the
reside there. However it was fortunate that
Project Coordination Unit (PCU) would be
LTBP's lead lakeshore institution in D.R.
based in Bujumbura, Burundi. Burundi was
Congo, the Centre de Recherche en
in a phase III UN security rating at the project's
Hydrobiologie (CRH), was based in Uvira
onset, thus following UN regulations, new
which is a 30-minute drive from Bujumbura.
project headquarters could not be established
Thus project staff could commute to Uvira
there. The PCU was relocated to Tanzania,
when security permitted to meet with
with the Project Coordinator (PC) establishing
Congolese affiliates and tend to the technical
an office in Dar es Salaam to coordinate the
and administrative aspects of the programme
project's policy aspects and the Scientific
in D.R. Congo. Congolese staff was also able
Liaison Officer (SLO) establishing an office
to commute to the Bujumbura Office and meet
in Kigoma to coordinate the lakeside technical
with project personnel there.
programme. This arrangement had the
When Burundi and eastern Congo
disadvantages of removing the PC from the
were both in phase IV security and the SLO
lake and separating the PC and SLO by a
and facilitators were relocated to Kigoma, the
considerable distance. It was also a sensitive
project was able to continue activities in Uvira
issue for Burundi, which noted that a number
and Bujumbura by periodically bringing key
of UN projects were operating in Burundi in
partners from national institutions to Kigoma
spite of security constraints and felt that LTBP
(boat and plane service was functioning) for
should as well.
briefings and technical sessions with project
The PCU and regional Steering
staff. In this way activities were able to
Committee remained flexible on this point and
continue and momentum was not lost.
during the project's third year, the SLO moved
When the war re-ignited in D.R.
her office to Bujumbura. At a SC meeting it
Congo, transportation between Uvira and
was decided that, given the security situation
Kinshasa was cut off. This was another
in Burundi, it would be too risky to move both
potentially fatal blow to the project for if the
the PC and SLO to Burundi. This caution was
National Working Group (NWG) with partners
borne out when 1.5 years later the UN security
in both locales could not meet, then there
rating was increased to phase IV, following
could be no meaningful consultation in
the killings of two UN aide workers, and the
establishing environmental priorities and the
SLO and facilitators were evacuated. The
Strategic Action Programme (SAP) in Congo.
momentum that would have been lost if both
The project arranged for the Kinshasa and
the PC and SLO had been based in Burundi
Uvira delegations to meet in a neutral location
at that time could have been devastating to
(Arusha, Tanzania) for their National SAP
the project. The SLO returned to the Kigoma
consultations. This was an added expense,
Office and was able to make short visits to
which was offset to some extent by the fact
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that the National Sectoral Problem Review
The productive waters and reed beds
and the National Environmental Priorities and
associated with the delta may be important
Strategies Review were held back-to-back
to the functioning of the Tanganyika
whereas they were two separate meetings in
ecosystem. The Reserve is located about 15
other countries.
km from Bujumbura, hence it was subject to
It was challenging and oftentimes
considerable human pressure from displaced
stressful to function under these constraints.
people and displaced cattle. For sometime,
It required sacrifices and flexibility on all parts.
the park staff had not been able to control
We found an ample supply of support,
grazing, fishing and harvesting of reeds and
patience and good will from national partners
grasses from the park. The park was a study
and expatriate staff in dealing with these
site for LTBP investigations on biodiversity,
constraints. This allowed the project to
sedimentation, fishing practices and socio-
accomplish a considerable body of work in
economic settings of the nearby populations.
Burundi and D.R. Congo which implicated
When the plan for downgrading and
these countries as equal partners in LTBP and
degazetting was announced, the LTBP
prepared the stage for fruitful regional
environmental education team, together with
collaboration.
the technical teams organized a seminar/
· Flexible, creative and adaptive
workshop for policy makers and local and
management strategies promote
provincial officials on the importance of Rusizi
progress in unpredictable settings or
National Park. There were informative
periods of insecurity.
presentations on subjects ranging from
species diversity to honoring Burundi's
4.2.2 Maintain a presence
commitment to the CBD, and there was
considerable debate. In the end, the park was
It is a challenge to coordinate activities in
downgraded and land was degazetted
countries when expatriate regional staff is not
anyway. We feel that this was a great loss,
allowed to live there. Still, we found that a
but perhaps not surprising given the human
considerable amount could be accomplished
pressures Burundi is currently facing. The
through emails, telephone calls and short-
presence of the LTBP teams, however, was
term visits to the country (as UNDP allowed)
important in publicizing the issue. They were
by regional staff or visits by national staff to
able to negotiate to minimize the losses and
other countries to meet with regional staff. It
used the opportunity to promote the
is important to go to these extra efforts to
importance of biodiversity and the
maintain a presence during times of conflict.
environment to policy makers and the media.
In neighboring Rwanda, conservation
They reinforced the message to local
and civil war have also come into conflict
populations by hosting an educational
during the last decade. Studies there have
campaign in association with World
highlighted the importance of maintaining a
Environment Day at the Reserve.
national presence throughout periods of
· Maintaining a reduced presence and
insecurity in preserving protected areas and
continuing to publicize conservation
the critical role of junior staff in facilitating this
issues during times of conflict brings
(Plumptre 2000; Plumptre et al. 2000). During
attention to conservation, and can
LTBP Rusizi National Park was downgraded
minimize losses, at a time when natural
to a Natural Reserve and 3,000 hectares were
resources are most vulnerable.
degazetted. The Rusizi River enters Lake
Tanganyika in the reserve and it has a unique
fish fauna and a bird fauna of global interest.
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4.2.3 Facilitate regional collaboration
· It is crucial that expatriate staff and
national staff in managerial and
LTBP was able to hold regional meetings,
coordinating roles be agreeable to
formulate a Strategic Action Programme and
collaborating with any and all
draft a Legal Convention during a period of
stakeholders and, moreover, be seen
strained relationships among Tanganyika's
to be impartial.
four riparian nations. This was due, in part,
to the close working relationships that
4.2.5 Do not underestimate people's good
members from these countries had formed
will during difficult times
while collaborating on various technical
components of the project. LTBP frequently
It is true that bad times can bring out the worst
gathered together national participants in the
in people. But in our experience, they can
technical programmes for regional workshops
also bring out the best in people. Even before
to share their experiences and develop
the two recent wars, eastern D.R. Congo was
strategies. Nationals assumed key leadership
in a dire political and economic state.
and training roles in some of these initiatives.
Employees at the Centre de Recherche en
Facilitating such experiences forced
Hydrobiologie, for example, had not received
participants to see beyond the prevailing
their government salaries for years at time.
political climate and fostered regional
This is almost a moot point because with the
collaboration. Such exchanges are also
inflation rate in D.R. Congo over the past
important to creating regional ownership and
decade, their salaries, even if they had
cultivating a shared vision (see Sections 4.3
received them, were not a livable wage.
and 4.4).
Everyone at CRH, and practically everyone
· Facilitating regional collaboration at all
we interacted with in D.R. Congo, was forced
levels (from technicians to policy
to diversify their livelihood strategies. In spite
makers) enables individuals from
of circumstances that would have
different countries to form close
discouraged most, CRH staff were still
working relationships. These bonds
reporting to work and collecting data. When
may permit project work to continue
the project arrived and was able to provide
even when the political climate is tense
some basic assistance (rehabilitation of
between the countries.
facilities, funds for activities and allowances)
staff became confident, productive and took
4.2.4 Remain neutral
a new pride in their work. In our experience,
people were tired and frustrated with the
At all times, but especially in times of
deteriorating political-economic situation that
uncertainty, it is important that project staff
was beyond their control. They wanted to be
remain politically neutral. The government
a part of something bigger that they perceived
and armed forces in charge of eastern D.R.
to be a good cause. They showed an amazing
Congo changed several times over the
resourcefulness, energy and good will in their
project's course. Burundi had four national
work that was conducted under some of the
coordinators during the life of the project.
most challenging circumstances conceivable.
While it is tempting to build close personal
·
Small incentives such as basic
alliances with key political figures in an
supplies and materials and the sense
attempt to accelerate progress, these
of contributing to an important cause
alliances can seriously hinder progress and
and can help stabilize communities
foster distrust by the successors if/when these
during periods of conflict.
people are replaced.
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4.2.6 Be briefed on security and have
the long gap between the countries signing
contingency plans
the project document and the implementing
subcontractors (NRI consortium) beginning
LTBP fortunately never had to cope with a
work. The countries pointed out that they
volatile security situation where project
were not adequately implicated in the project's
personnel were in immediate danger. This is
design and the preparation of the Project
probably due to a combination of good fortune
Document. Nor were they involved in the
and good planning. UN offices and
selection of the implementing subcontractor.
embassies have security plans in place. It is
The NRI consortium's technical and financial
important to become integrated into this
bid was not circulated to the countries before
system. In addition these organizations run
their staff arrived in the field to begin work,
regular security briefing sessions and periodic
thus the countries had no notions of the
personal security workshops. We found this
technical programme planned for their
framework and these guidelines crucial in
countries nor the resources available to
planning and executing activities. National
realize it. All of these things diminished any
staff was also an important source of
sense of national or regional ownership of the
information about security conditions. A radio
project from the outset.
network helped keep the project coordinated
· Good
communication
and
and updated with respect to security.
transparency between the primary
Because we had contingency plans in place,
implementing and executing agencies
when expatriate staff were evacuated, the
and the partner countries on these
process went smoothly and activities were
aspects is essential.
able to continue under national administration
and supervision.
4.3.2 Need to implicate highest levels of
While the security situation can
government
deteriorate suddenly, in our experience it
seldom improved suddenly. Working in these
Some of the next important steps for the
conditions is trying. In spite of the situation,
conservation of the lake include ratifying the
a considerable amount can be accomplished
legal Convention, establishing the Lake
toward national and regional goals. The
Tanganyika Authority, implementing the
current situation is likely to persist for some
Strategic Action Programme, and integrating
time and we hope others will continue work
conservation activities into other sectors.
within the constraints. Many people are
These steps will require the participation and
counting on it and their futures are too
commitment of political authorities in the
important and the resource is too valuable to
highest levels of government. In retrospect,
neglect during such times of need.
we regret that we did not, for example,
· Create security and contingency plans,
convoke a meeting of ministers from the four
brief staff and liase with other
countries early on in the project, to begin
organizations on security matters.
raising awareness and cultivating support at
these levels. It is not clear that this would
4.3 Project Ownership and Partnerships
have been possible, given the prevailing
political circumstances in the region at the
4.3.1 National and regional ownership
time, but it is the next important step.
·
The next phase should strive to raise
Communications between Tanganyika's
awareness at the highest political levels from
riparian states and GEF implementing and
the beginning.
executing agencies were very limited during
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4.4. National Ownership
programme. Day to day river monitoring was
contracted out to individuals living on the lake,
4.4.1 Lead institutions and their
but who did not necessarily have an affiliation
relationship to the lake
with a national institution.
Neither strategy proved to be
The lead agency for LTBP in all four countries
sustainable in the long-term. Without a project
was a department or division in government
presence, monitoring water quality has taken
or a parastatal organization concerned with
a low priority for institutions mandated to study
the environment and/or conservation. The
and regulate fisheries. Likewise, without the
lead agency played a central role in furnishing
material and financial assistance the project
the National Coordinator (and in some cases
afforded, researchers in capital cities are
the Assistant National Coordinator) and
unable to travel to the lake and continue their
organizing the National Working Group
studies of sediment dynamics, also river
(NWG) which were seen as key components
gauging has been discontinued in these
in both implementing the technical
countries.
programme and formulating the Strategic
In addition to ambiguities regarding the
Action Programme. In most cases the lead
appropriate collaborating agencies, the
agencies had a mandate for creating policy
distance between the lead agencies and the
rather than implementing projects and they
lakeside institutions also hindered
generally had little experience in working on
collaboration and the development of a
lake issues. In D.R. Congo, Tanzania and
collective national ownership. NWG meetings
Zambia the lead agencies had no
typically occurred in capital cities and lakeside
representation near the lake.
institutions generally felt underrepresented at
LTBP's considerable technical
these events. They expressed frustration by
programme, for practical reasons, had to be
the fact that the project was sometimes
based at the lakeside of the four countries.
represented nationally and regionally by
This led, in some cases11, to ambiguity as to
people who had not visited the lake.
the appropriate agency to conduct a study.
Collaboration was complicated because the
Different LTBP studies adopted different
lead agencies and lakeside institutions
approaches to dealing with this. The Pollution
oftentimes reported to different ministers or
Special Study (POLSS), for example, trained
branches of government. In our experience,
lakeside fisheries researchers in Kigoma and
establishing close collaboration between
Mpulungu to conduct basic water quality
ministries at a distant location where only one
studies. Because the POLSS programme
ministry has representation is a difficult thing
involved weekly sampling and the need for
to achieve.
rapid analysis they decided to collaborate with
This issue of lakeside representation
fisheries institutions that were already working
will diminish somewhat as conservation
on the lake on a regular basis and give them
issues are no longer considered the domain
additional responsibilities to study water
of the conservation sector but rather are
quality parameters. The Sedimentation
integrated into the policies and agendas of
Special Study (SEDSS) opted for a different
all sectors. This, however, requires a major
strategy, recruiting geology professors from
change in national policies and high level
Dar es Salaam and Lusaka to make periodic
political commitment to facilitate it (see
visits to the lakeside to guide the technical
Section 4.3). Considerable consultation,
11 This was not an issue for Burundi where the lead institution and all the logical collaborating partners had representation in Bujumbura,
the lakeside capital. This might have been an issue for D.R. Congo, but with transportation links severed during the insecurity, the project
was forced to rely exclusively on lakeside personnel for its technical programme. Fortunately, the CRH in Uvira already had a broad
mandate to cover biological, physical-chemical and socio-economic aspects of the Lake.
114

coordination and time will be necessary to
should be sanctioned by the highest
achieve this. In the meantime future
levels of government.
interventions will have to deal with this
obstacle. We recommend addressing it at the
4.4.3 National Coordinators and National
outset with national meetings implicating all
Directors
relevant ministries to address the
mechanisms for establishing this
The LTBP midterm evaluation suggested that
collaboration. We also point out that the ways
LTBP National Coordinators should in fact be
to achieve this collaboration and collective
National Directors. Their seniority (all
national ownership, i.e. by enabling officials
Directors or Director Generals) and their many
from the lead agencies to acquire lakeside
other governmental obligations coupled with
field experience and representatives from
the many demands of coordinating LTBP
lakeside institutions and communities to
national activities would support this. The
participate in NWG meetings, will have
midterm evaluation suggested recruiting full
significant budgetary implications.
time NCs employed by the project to tend to
· Budget money and time and establish
the project's day to day administration and
mechanisms
for
facilitating
facilitation. This structure would also have
collaboration between the various
avoided the conflict of interest noted by UNDP,
stakeholder institutions that do not
that the LTBP National Coordinators were
have a history of collaborating and/or
responsible for both implementing the project
are separated by considerable
in their countries through the National Working
distance.
Groups and monitoring or steering project
progress through the Steering Committee.
4.4.2 Assessment of institutional
Normally these roles should be filled by two
mandates and capacity
different people. Although in some cases the
appointment of Assistant NCs mid-way
In retrospect, some of the confusion noted
through the project effectively achieved this,
above could have been avoided if the project
we would support a clear separation of roles
development or design had included a formal
from the outset.
assessment of institutional mandates and
· Establish the division between
capacities. Lacking such an assessment led
implementation and evaluation at
to an ad-hoc process of developing working
national and regional levels early in the
agreements with key institutions, with the
project.
Project Coordination Unit (PCU) usually
negotiating directly with the director of the
4.4.4 Financial Control
institute who may or may not have been
mandated from higher levels to participate.
Project ownership and financial decisions are
In some cases this led to confusing
linked. It is difficult to assume ownership of a
arrangements in terms of responsibilities and
project where budget lines are beyond one's
accountability. It also exacerbated the
control. LTBP eventually allocated a budget
impression that the national institutions were
for the NCs to convoke NWG meetings,
servicing the project rather than participating
among other activities. However, some
in a task of national importance mandated by
affiliates point out that allocation of part of
higher authorities with the project's support
the project budget to individual countries early
. ·
A formal assessment of institutional
in the project would also have strengthened
mandates and capacities should be
feelings of ownership.
conducted before implementation and
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· Budgets and the ability to make
idea of extending the boundaries of existing
financial decisions can enhance
protected terrestrial areas to include adjacent
national ownership.
waters has been discussed for a decade
(Cohen 1991, Cohen 1992, Coulter and
4.4.5 Stakeholder Participation
Mubamba 1993, Coulter 1999). Some of
these authors emphasize the need for urgent
With the caveats noted above, many national
action given the magnitude of the threats to
stakeholders praised LTBP on its participatory
Tanganyika's biodiversity. The irony that we,
nature and its ability to implicate many
10 years later, reiterate some of these same
different stakeholders in the technical
recommendations to extend terrestrial park
programmes and the strategic planning
boundaries is not lost on us. We are perhaps
process. Some LTBP affiliates noted that
the victims of what Coulter (1999) refers to
participation from a wide variety of
as `the present fashion for protracted planning
stakeholders is time-consuming to develop,
(so-called strategic, iterative, long-term etc.)'
expensive and may dilute the feelings of
which he points out can lead to `a limbo of
ownership of the principal institutions
planning paralysis.' Coulter (1999) cautions
involved. However most collaborators agreed
that `conservation will be retarded critically
that sustainably managing Lake Tanganyika's
until the different perspectives can be
biological resources is a cross-sectoral issue
bridged.'
and necessarily demands the diverse
We would caution that conservation is
viewpoints and specializations of a variety of
likely to be neither effective nor sustainable
stakeholders. Though some collaborators
until these different perspectives can be
listed stakeholder groups that should have
bridged. Numerous studies have
been better implicated (e.g. village
demonstrated that imposing a plan will not
governments and community-based
work (Ghimire and Pimbert 1997, Jentoft and
organizations) it was generally felt that LTBP
McCay 1995, Mayers and Bass 1999). The
was successful in implicating a broad variety
plan itself needs to arise through consultation
of stakeholders. The diverse technical
and compromise. LTBP attempted to do this
programmes, the NWG structure in some
through participatory training and research
cases and the SAP planning process were
where national teams were given the chance
cited as good vehicles for generating broad
to collect, analyze and interpret data on the
stakeholder participation. Local participation
state of the system and discuss it in national
was repeatedly cited among the project
and regional fora with a variety of
strengths by national collaborators. A formal
stakeholders. As a result of this process, and
stakeholder analysis at the project
based on the habitats and the proportion of
development stage (see Section 4.4.2) would
diversity that would be afforded some
certainly have strengthened and facilitated
protection, the Biodiversity Special Study
stakeholder participation.
endorsed the idea of extending some of the
· Allow time and create forums to
existing terrestrial park boundaries (see
establish
broad
stakeholder
Section 3.3.2.1), though they express concern
participation.
about who will finance these conservation
initiatives (see Section 4.6).
4.5 Execution and Implementation
· Cultivating a shared vision takes time.
It is expensive. But it is a crucial step
4.5.1 Cultivating a shared vision
in the process.
Some of the ideas presented in the special
study reports are not new. For example the
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4.5.2 Establishing a coordinated project
4.5.3 Linking the social sciences and the
mission
natural sciences
LTBP's special studies in biodiversity,
Linking the socio-economic data with data
pollution, sedimentation, fishing practices,
from the other technical studies (biodiversity,
socio-economics and environmental
pollution, sedimentation, fishing practices) is
education all had important training and
perhaps the most challenging aspect of
capacity-building experiences and produced
coordinating the technical programmes. Most
important outputs in a participatory way.
natural scientists, who have visited the lake,
However, they did so with little coordination
do not refute the claim by the Socio-Economic
and consultation among themselves.
Special Study (SESS) that it is "the balance
Because the special studies did not
between man's activities and protecting the
coordinate sites and methodologies, it is
environment that is the important thing" nor
impossible at the project's conclusion, to
their assertion that "the biodiversity of Lake
analyze the various datasets in a concerted
Tanganyika will only be managed sustainably
or quantitative way. For example, it is not
and conserved through programmes of
possible to assess and quantify the relative
poverty alleviation, livelihood diversification
impacts of different threats on biodiversity at
and social and economic development in the
a particular site. Different special studies had
lakeshore communities" (Meadows and Zwick
different plans and different visions. Perhaps
2000). These claims by the SESS team agree
because they were contracted to different
with other studies on the importance of socio-
organizations within the NRI consortium or
economics to conservation success (GEF
perhaps through weak scientific leadership,
1998, GEF 1998). However, balancing
they were never able to work together on a
conservation and development of local
lakewide scale for this larger cause.
livelihoods is difficult. Most people involved
There were a few sites where special
in LTBP had experience in one domain or the
studies were, to some extent, coordinated
other. Integrating data from the natural and
(notably the Rusizi Delta (BIOSS, POLSS,
social sciences in a meaningful way requires
SEDSS, FPSS, SESS, EE) in Burundi and
vision and for both groups to stretch their skills
several sites near Mpulungu, Zambia) where
and understanding.
more than one study collected data. These
· Mechanisms to facilitate collaboration
sites tend to be the most interesting sites for
between the social and natural
scientific consideration because multiple
sciences need to be established at the
datasets exist, though for the most part, they
beginning.
cannot be analyzed in a coordinated way.
Coordinating the special studies would
4.5.4 Financial incentives are necessary
have required considerable planning,
preparation and cooperation. In the end, less
It was originally intended that national staff
work might have been accomplished overall.
would be partially seconded to the project.
But we would encourage future initiatives to
They would continue to receive their national
attempt such coordination, for it is only
salaries while committing a portion of their
through such an approach that the threats to
time to LTBP activities. The time and effort
Tanganyika's biodiversity can be compared
that national staff contributed to the project
and quantified in a scientific way.
would be considered part of the government's
· Future interventions should work with
contribution in kind.
key participants to create a joint
In our experience, this plan was
mission statement and harmonize
perhaps too idealistic and did not account for
work plans early in the project.
the socio-economic pressures facing our
117

national colleagues. The national institutions
Once basic research and monitoring
and economies of Tanganyika's riparian
on Lake Tanganyika are integrated into the
states are struggling and national salaries,
mandates of national institutions and these
when they were paid (see comments in
institutions find adequate funds to fulfil their
Section 4.2), were very low such that many
mandates, we hope the need for financial
affiliates, from technicians to General
incentives will diminish. But changing the
Directors, were forced to diversify their
mandates of national institutions and securing
livelihood strategies. Some were lucky to find
finances to support these changes requires
additional consultancies in their field or in a
high level political commitment and in a
related field, but many were involved in the
complex project spanning several different
private sector, fishing, farming, owning
ministries in four countries this will require
minibuses or taxis, etc. In such a climate,
considerable more time and effort.
where everyone is forced to work outside of
· Financial incentives do undermine
their regular jobs in order to make ends meet,
sustainability, but they may be
it is unrealistic to expect people to make
necessary in troubled economies
significant commitments to unpaid work
when the rewards of conserving
where the benefits (saving biodiversity) seem
biodiversity are distant from people's
distant to their immediate needs of feeding
immediate needs.
and educating their children. In our
experience, people did want to contribute to
4.5.5 Be sensitive to language
conservation. They perceived it as a good
considerations and budget time and
cause and they worked to the best of their
money for translation
abilities with commitment and good spirit.
Many collaborators made personal sacrifices
The French-speaking countries (Burundi and
and contributed considerably more than was
D.R. Congo) perceived the project as having
expected of them. But it is unrealistic and
a bias toward the anglophone countries
unfair to think they would do so without
(Tanzania and Zambia). A variety of factors
modest financial incentives.
contributed to this perception. Important ways
National collaborators pointed out that
to avoid this in the future are to insist that key
it is also unrealistic to expect national staff
project personnel be bilingual (see Section
(who sometimes had the same level of
4.5.7) and to budget sufficient time and
training) to work in good faith alongside
financial resources for translation. For all
expatriate regional staff who were earning a
countries, in a multi-country project with
comfortable living. Such discrepancies foster
multiple languages, to feel like equal partners,
resentment rather than collegiality. National
a considerable amount of time and financial
collaborators also emphasized the need for
resources must be allocated for translating
incentive payments to be uniform throughout
documents. We found hiring a translator from
the region and for them to be established and
the region as a full-time member of staff to be
dispersed in a transparent way.
economical in the long-term. Funds must also
Other GEF reviews (GEF 1998) have
be allocated for simultaneous translation at
noted that financial payments undermine
regional meetings.
sustainability. We can confirm this. When
· Budget sufficient time and money for
payments stopped at the project's end, so did
translation and insist on language
the bulk of research and monitoring activities
qualifications for regional staff.
on Lake Tanganyika. However, for the
reasons described above, they would have
never started in the first place if it had not
been for payments.
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4.5.6 Do not underestimate staffing needs
4.5.8 It takes time
The project began with two full-time expatriate
Other studies have noted that developing
staff based in the region, the Project
partnerships within governments, the private
Coordinator (PC) and the Scientific Liaison
sector and communities takes time, effort,
Officer (SLO). The PC tended to the
persistence and financial resources (GEF
government and policy aspects of the project
1998, Ollila 2000), usually much more than
and the SLO oversaw the technical
was originally planned. Our experiences
programme and served as the link between
confirm this. LTBP would have benefited from
the UK-based study coordinators and the field
an initial preparatory phase to conduct
teams. Given the project's complexity (eight
institutional, stakeholder and training needs
technical
programmes
operating
assessments and establish necessary
simultaneously in four countries) and its
infrastructure. Lack of adequate preparation
emphasis on capacity building, this design
time caused significant delays in the technical
was overly optimistic. We found that full-time,
programmes. The project was consequently
regional-based facilitators having technical,
forced to begin the strategic planning process
training and some managerial responsibilities
before all the results from the special studies
were essential for guiding and ensuring the
were finalized, though the final Transboundary
completion of work programmes. They also
Diagnostic Analysis attempted to compensate
proved to be more cost-effective and more
for this. A post-special study analysis phase
satisfying to the national institutions (in terms
would have allowed for a more detailed and
of availability and continued feedback) than
coordinated consideration of the various
short-term visits by consultants.
technical data, some of which was still coming
· Do not underestimate staffing needs.
in as the SAP was being formulated.
For technical studies where training
· Budget the timing of activities carefully
and capacity-building are important,
and allow for a preparatory phase.
full-time facilitators based in the region
are usually preferable to short-term
4.5.9 Email links and websites facilitate
visits by senior consultants.
communications
4.5.7 Recruitment of international posts
Long distance telephone connections within
and between Tanganyika's riparian nations
Recruitment of the expatriate, international
are extremely expensive. LTBP provided
posts (PCU, special studies leaders and
email links for the lakeside stations and the
facilitators) received mixed reviews from the
lead agencies. This relatively small
region. National partners emphasized that in
investment paid back greatly in terms of
addition to a good level of competency in their
increased communication within the region.
respective fields, these key regional posts
We found that HF and cellular modems are
required people who were: proficient in both
not as convenient as telephone-line based
English and French, able to commit the
links (e.g. they are too slow for worldwide web
necessary time to their study (for non-full-time
access) but still an important contribution at
personnel) and who had a `bon esprit' for
our more remote stations where telephone
working under challenging circumstances.
service was poor or nonexistent.
·
Consider language skills, but also
In addition to providing international
availability and capacity to work under
publicity for the project, the LTBP web site
difficult conditions during recruitment
was an important resource for project
for international posts.
affiliates. All of the important project
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documents, including progress reports,
nations. However, the national governments
steering committee meeting minutes, data
had not or were not able to commit resources
and reports from the special studies, the
to funding the programme (also emphasizing
Strategic Action Programme and the draft
the Need to implicate highest levels of
Legal Convention can be accessed and
government see Section 4.4) and the
downloaded from the LTBP web site. It serves
governments nor the project were able to
as an archive and library for the project. The
attract outside funding for this on short notice.
web site and document database is also
The same was true for the environmental
available on CD-ROM, especially for those
education campaigns.
stations that cannot access the internet easily
It is frustrating to all involved when
because of poor telephone connections.
initiatives begin, refine their methodology, get
National collaborators cited these investments
results and then are forced to stop.
in communications and information
Institutional memory, momentum and
accessibility as being among the most
collaborators' confidence is lost.
important outputs of LTBP.
· Planning for continued activities and
· Email links and websites will increase
subsequent work needs to begin well
productivity by facilitating inexpensive
before a project's conclusion and
communication and document
requires full, active and collaborative
distribution.
participation between the governments
and implementing agency.
4.5.10 Planning for the post-project phase
4.5.11 Use appropriate technologies
Project staff and partners expressed dismay
at the abrupt cessation of LTBP activities at
New technologies can have a profound
the close of the 5-year project. While LTBP
impact. The introduction of email links at the
had a considerable budget for `sustainable
remote lakeside stations changed
activities,' most of this was used to support
communication both within and between
the essential national and regional
riparian countries. Some of the project
consultations to formulate the SAP. Almost
technologies, however, were perhaps overly
everyone agrees that the SAP is the project's
ambitious for local conditions and the levels
key output and the key to conserving the
of funding available for training. The BIOSS
lake's resources into the future. But many
databases and GIS are excellent resources,
partners recognize other activities, such as
however, unfortunately they are presently
monitoring and environmental education, to
underused and underappreciated. They are
be important in the short and long-term future
currently beyond the technical capacity of
of the lake.
most of the appropriate national institutions.
LTBP designed a basic monitoring
Unfortunately they were finished quite late in
programme as a part of its mandate (see
the project such that there were not sufficient
Allison et al. 2000), in which coordinated
funds to commit to adequate training sessions
special study teams would continue to monitor
for these systems.
biodiversity, pollution, sediment inputs, and
· Institutional assessments should
fishing practices at several sites in each
evaluate technological capacity and
country. At a total cost to the region of about
project technologies, resources and
$70,000 US per year, the programme was
training sessions should be designed
designed to be minimalist and relatively low-
accordingly.
cost with the hope it could attract outside
funding or be funded by the four riparian
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4.5.12 The countries in a multi-country
only country, during the life of our project, with
project are different
reliable, regular transport between all the
other riparian countries. As such, it served
In implementing multi-country projects, it is
as a local hub for regional meetings and
tempting to try to treat all the countries the
activities. Congo has a large hydrobiological
same. Many of our technical studies, for
institute with a broad mandate to study aquatic
example, designed a single workplan and
dynamics on the lakeshore. This institution
attempted to execute it in the same way in all
offers special opportunities to integrate
four countries. This strategy was thought to
workplans and study interdisciplinary aspects
be fair and equitable in terms of distributing
of lake dynamics that would be much more
resources and easier to implement and
difficult to achieve in the other countries.
manage. We found that this strategy,
Zambia has very strong village chiefs and
however, almost always produced mixed
governments
which
allowed
the
results. Technical components with a single
environmental education and socio-
specific workplan typically succeeded in some
economics teams to easily access and work
countries and failed in others. The success
with local communities through the Village
or failure of a programme could often be
Conservation and Development Committees.
attributed to some local governmental, socio-
For a variety of historical reasons, such
economic, cultural, political, historical or other
arrangements do not exist and/or would be
aspect of the area, such as security, proximity
unlikely to work in the other countries, but
to a university or other source of trained
offered an excellent opportunity in Zambia.
personnel, or the strength and level of
In designing workplans for multicountry
participation in the local government.
projects, it is important to create broad
Multicountry projects must recognize,
regional goals that the countries can work
early on, these differences between the
towards in different ways based on their local
countries and tailor workplans to capitalize on
opportunities and constraints. This
opportunities and to compensate for
underscores the need for thorough
constraints. We found, for example, that our
institutional assessments in the planning
Tanzanian and Zambian stations were located
stages of the project (see Section 4.4.2) and
in relatively small lakeside towns such that
requires adaptive management and
trained national staff were in short supply and
considerable flexibility on the part of the
in some cases technical expertise had to be
technical and implementing teams.
imported from other parts of the countries.
· Do not assume that a single workplan
These were not constraints at our stations in
is appropriate for all the countries in a
Burundi and Congo, however, security
multi-country project. Consider the
conditions in these countries greatly impacted
various opportunities and constraints
the teams' fieldwork and workplans had to be
of individual countries and tailor
adjusted accordingly.
workplans to capitalize on the
At the same time, specific conditions
opportunities.
in each country afforded unique opportunities
as well. Burundi, for example, has its capital
4.6 Other Considerations: Conservation
on the lakeshore which allowed a number of
high-level government officials and politicians
and Development at Lake Tanganyika
to be closely involved in the technical
programmes and increased overall public
In response to the UN Conference on
awareness of the project. Tanzania is
Environment and Development (UNCED) in
centrally located with good security and the
Rio de Janeiro in 1992, many governments,
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international aid agencies and NGOs have
the Tanganyika Basin, it lacked a rigorous
adopted integrated conservation and
livelihood analysis. Nonetheless, this
development (ICAD) programmes. These
information and the results of the other special
programmes are guided by the Convention
studies allowed Allison et al. (2001) to explore
on Biological Diversity (CBD) which
these benefits and the link between
advocates a utilitarian approach to
conservation and development in the
conservation through sustainable use and
Tanganyika Basin. The remaining discussion
equitable sharing of benefits derived from
is based on ideas and conclusions presented
exploiting biodiversity. LTBP tried to conform
in the BIOSS final technical report (Allison et
to this approach, recognizing that there is a
al. 2001).
moral imperative to ensure that biodiversity
Allison et al. (2001) point out that
conservation does not take place at the
conservation projects can use a mixture of
expense of social and economic
different strategies or interventions. These
development.
strategies include: direct protection, economic
The theoretical basis for ICAD
substitution and linked incentives.
approaches is that there need not be a conflict
Direct protection is the current model
between conservation and development (in
for conservation in Lake Tanganyika and
the form of poverty eradication). Indeed, for
much of the early thinking in developing the
development to be sustainable the two must
Lake Tanganyika GEF initiative (Cohen 1991)
be reconciled: maintaining `natural capital' is
was driven by this approach. In direct
integral to sustainable development, and only
protection, people are excluded from areas
through development will the poor have the
set aside for biodiversity conservation and
resources and ability to exercise choice in not
they benefit little from conservation activities.
having to degrade the environment in order
While this `fines and fences' approach may
to survive. Along the shores of Lake
work in areas with low population densities,
Tanganyika and the other African Great
the downgrading in status and the degazetting
Lakes, where many of the world's poorest
of land in of Rusizi National Park attest to its
people survive by exploiting some of the
failure in areas under high pressure from
world's most diverse ecosystems, the need
humans. Given the levels of poverty and
to integrate conservation and development
livelihood insecurity experienced by many in
strategies is urgent and great.
the catchment area, there is a moral
Underpinning ICAD approaches is the
imperative to prioritize development and seek
assumption that the people around Lake
compatibility between development and
Tanganyika can benefit more from conserving
conservation. The direct protection approach
biodiversity than they can from overexploiting
is anachronistic given these human
it. Conserved ecosystem function and
considerations.
proceeds from ecotourism are posited as
The economic substitution approach
examples of such potential benefits at Lake
is another conservation model. In this
Tanganyika (Cohen 1991, Cohen 1992,
approach conservation projects attempt to
Coulter and Mubamba 1993, Coulter 1999).
implement livelihood activities such as
However, this key assumption and these
developing rural industries that provide an
proposed benefits warrant critical
alternative to livelihood options seen to
examination.
threaten biodiversity, such as farming on
There is little data on the economic
steep rift valley slopes or fishing with beach
value of biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika and
seines. The LTBP Socio-Economics Special
while the Socio-Economics Special Study
Study found that such alternatives were
provided an image of livelihood strategies in
difficult to identify, though they were able to
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suggest a range of development interventions
ecotourism will be considerable (Allison et al.
to increase the value of harvested natural
2001).
resources and reduce environmentally
Linkages between the most
damaging activities. Providing income
biodiverse areas and livelihood activities in
generating alternatives to local people that are
Lake Tanganyika are weak. Most fishing
not linked to incentives for biodiversity
activity targets the species-poor pelagic
conservation does not mitigate against the
system, whereas most of the biodiversity is
external threats. People not benefiting from
concentrated in the littoral zone. There is a
alternative income generating activities
strong link between the six economically
remain potential threats to the environment.
important pelagic species and livelihood
Like the direct protection model, the economic
activities around the lake. This strong link
substitution approach may work in areas of
gives us optimism that efforts to conserve the
low population density, but again, the high
pelagic fish stocks, through changes in
population densities and large numbers of
livelihood activities (e.g. mesh size regulations
displaced people in the northern basin
or closing certain areas to fishing at certain
suggest it is unlikely to be an effective
times) might be successful if accompanied by
approach throughout the basin.
strong environmental education programmes.
Finally, ICAD projects fall under the
But because fishing livelihoods around Lake
`linked incentives' model that attempts to link
Tanganyika rely on just a few species, the link
biodiversity and livelihood development
between Tanganyika's rich biodiversity of
strategies. In such approaches both people
global interest and people's livelihoods is
and biodiversity benefit and are empowered
weak. Connections between farming
by the conservation initiative. At Lake
livelihoods and biodiversity are even weaker
Tanganyika, the development of sport fishing,
as loss of the species rich littoral zone to
ecotourism and the aquarium trade are often
sedimentation will have little impact on
cited as examples of ways in which
farming livelihoods in the greater catchment
biodiversity conservation can be linked to
area. Such weak linkages between
enhanced livelihood opportunities. While no
biodiversity and livelihoods are not good
formal costs benefits analysis has been
conditions for ICAD programmes that seek
conducted on this, we believe such thinking
to sustain both livelihoods and diversity by
to be unrealistic. While other authors have
enhancing the values of such linkages
assumed that parks will benefit local people
(Salafsky and Wollenberg 2000).
as well as biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika
These observations lead Allison et al
(Cohen 1991, Cohen 1992, Coulter and
(2001) to conclude:
Mubamba 1993, Coulter 1999), evidence from
· Linkages between biodiversity and
studies around the world suggests the
livelihoods in Lake Tanganyika are
contrary, that the benefits of protected areas
weak and indirect at best.
accrue internationally while the costs are
borne locally (Wells 1992). Consideration of
· Linkages between biodiversity and
the political stability, infrastructure, access,
ecosystems function (and therefore
and quality of natural features compared to
provision of ecosystem services) are
other locales suggests that profitable
unproven but also likely to be weak.
ecotourism in Lake Tanganyika is not likely in
the near future. In Lake Tanganyika the
· Financial benefits from alternative
benefits of establishing protected areas are
livelihoods
associated
with
likely to accrue internationally while the
conservation activities are likely to be
national costs for developing parks to promote
very limited.
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And therefore:
not come from the local people who value the
· Self-sustaining ICAD programmes in
resources but not the biodiversity. Rather, it
Lake Tanganyika are not currently
should come from those who value the
feasible. Funding for conservation
biodiversity but do not need the resources,
activities will have to come from
i.e. the global community. This implies
external sources if conservation is not
continued international funding of
to impose costs on those living around
conservation programmes and detailed
the lake.
attention to ways of transferring financial
resources for conservation in support of the
External funding could potentially come from
type of poverty alleviation programmes
governments or international agencies. Given
identified by the LTBP SESS. Such a
that the governments of Burundi, D.R. Congo,
conclusion is not unique, Allison et al. (2001)
Tanzania and Zambia are struggling
noted, that other authors have recently
economies and conservation programmes
questioned the prevailing orthodoxy of
compete against poverty alleviation, AIDS
development through conservation. Godoy
programmes, food security and civil war/
et al. (2000) argue that local forest dwellers
peace initiatives for government funding, it is
in Central America should be paid for non-
unlikely the riparian nations will be able to
local values of rainforests as an incentive to
prioritize biodiversity conservation in Lake
resist deforestation. The lake dwellers of
Tanganyika in the near future.
Central Africa merit the same consideration
Allison et al. (2001) emphasize that
to preserve the non-local values of Lake
funding for biodiversity conservation should
Tanganyika's biodiversity.
124